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ABSTRACT 
This paper updates the literature on water utility benchmarking studies carried out 
worldwide, focusing on scale and scope economies. Using meta-regression analysis, the 
study investigates which variables from published studies influence these economies. Our 
analysis led to several conclusions. The results indicate that there is a higher probability of 
finding diseconomies of scale and scope in large utilities; however, only the results for 
scale economies are significant. Diseconomies of scale and scope are more likely to be 
found in publicly-owned utilities than when the ownership is mostly private; as would be 
expected, multi-utilities are more likely to have scale and scope economies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, quantitative water sector studies have focused on measuring performance 
and identifying factors affecting costs. Until the 1980s only a handful of benchmarking 
studies could be found in the literature (papers in academic journals, PhD dissertations, 
working papers, chapters of books and books). In the 90s about three dozen studies were 
published. By the end of 2010, more than 250 studies were available compared to 2009, 
when Berg and Marques (2010) were only able to identify 190 studies. Past studies use 
cost or production functions to evaluate the performance of water utilities with several 
aims, such as examining the scale, scope or density economies of a particular country or 
region, determining the influence of ownership and other exogenous variables on 
efficiency (e.g. Renzetti and Dupont, 2009), investigating the extent and impact of 
incentive systems and alternative governance models, and assessing performance and 
identifying best practices. Most of these water utility benchmarking studies use parametric 
methods for efficiency estimation, although some apply non-parametric methods. Such 
studies have proven to be extremely useful in introducing yardstick competition, promoting 
cost containment, identifying efficient prices, and encouraging quality of service 
improvements in water utilities. 
 
This study analyzes the literature concerning scale and scope economies. Inappropriate 
market structure (size distribution of utilities relative to the market size) jeopardizes the 
attainment of organizational efficiency and reduces the value for money in monopolized 
markets (Bel and Warner, 2008). Although governments intervene to curb the exercise of 
market power and correct market failures, through regulation or policies that promote 
competition, the presence of scale and scope economies suggests that customers require 
protection from monopoly pricing. Scale (or size) economies exist when an expansion in 
an output can be achieved with less than a proportionate increase in costs, whereas scope 
economies are present when the production costs of two or more products jointly produced 
are lower than when they are produced separately by two specialized entities (Baumol et 
al., 1988). Thus, scale economies are related to the scale of production and scope 
economies to the savings arising from the joint production of goods or services.  
 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the (1) optimal scale of water utilities, (2) 
existence of scope economies between different types of services (e.g. water and 
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wastewater services), (3) extent of economies of vertical integration (scope economies 
between the various stages of the production chain). Some empirical studies find scale and 
scope economies; the existence of (short run) high fixed costs in the water sector may 
reflect sharing of administrative and procurement costs. However, others find 
diseconomies and explain the higher costs due to the network complexity, and the 
bureaucracies associated with large utilities (Abbott and Cohen, 2009). 
 
Perhaps because of these ambiguities (and unique circumstances related to water resource 
access, national income differences, and different legal systems), quite distinct water utility 
arrangements and different results between studies can be found around the world. Even in 
a single nation, suppliers can range from very small water utilities providing services to 
small villages to large utilities providing services to many customers in a large 
municipality or a region. Moreover, in some countries the drinking water supply is 
provided as a single service (e.g. the Netherlands); in others it is provided together with 
wastewater (e.g. France) and also with other services, such as urban waste, electricity or 
gas (e.g. Germany). There are also vertically integrated water utilities that are responsible 
for the wholesale and retail (distribution) segments (e.g. Spain), and others that deal with 
the wholesale or retail segments separately (e.g. Portugal). Table 1 presents the market 
structure in Europe. No clear patterns are observed in terms of size of scale and scope 
services. Developing countries have a similar range of institutional arrangements.  
 
Figure 1 shows the growth of studies examining scale and scope economies, with the 
number published each year shown on the vertical axis. These past studies provide the 
“raw material” for the meta-regression analysis presented in the current study. 
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Table 1 – Market structure in the Europe 
Country Water utilities (no.) 
Average 
population 
(no./utility) 
Scope of services  Vertical Integration 
Austria 5,000 1,640 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Belgium 28 375,000 Water and wastewater Mostly unbundled 
Czech Republic  1,211 8,505 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Denmark  2,622 2,059 Water and wastewater (two multiutilities) Integrated 
England and Wales 25 2,148,000 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Finland 1,400 3,786 Water and wastewater Integrated 
France  19,300 3,337 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Germany  6,000 13,667 Multiutilities and water and wastewater separated Integrated 
Greece 1,000 11,000 Water and wastewater Mostly integrated 
Holland 
10 (water) 1,650,000 Water 
Unbundled 
443 
(collection) 660 Wastewater 
25 (sewage 
treatment) 37,246 Wastewater 
Ireland  3,051 1,409 Water and wastewater Mostly integrated 
Italy 91 648,352 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Luxembourg 106 4,528 Water and wastewater Mostly integrated 
Northern Ireland  1 1,700,000 Water and wastewater Integrated 
Norway  1,616 2,908 Water and wastewater and other municipal activities Integrated 
Portugal  300 31,278 Water and wastewater and sometimes other activities 
Mostly 
unbundled 
Romania 2,000 7,700 Water, wastewater and urban waste Unbundled 
Scotland  1 5,100,000 Water and wastewater Mostly integrated 
Spain  8,100 5,556 Water and wastewater Mostly integrated 
Sweden 294 30,612 Water and wastewater. There are 5 multiutilities  Integrated 
Switzerland 3,000 2,467 Multiutilities  Integrated 
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Figure 1- Studies of scale and scope economies per year 
 
After briefly surveying previously published benchmarking studies about scale and scope 
economies, the current research investigates, by means of a meta-regression analysis, 
which variables or characteristics of samples from published studies have the greatest 
influence on estimated size of scale and scope economies. The sample encompasses all the 
benchmarking studies (published and unpublished) dealing with performance scores based 
on production or cost estimates. The sample comprises all the articles published in 
academic journals in the following fields: Economics, Public Policy, Public 
Administration, Political Science and Environmental and Water Policy. The sample also 
includes articles in edited books, chapters of books, PhD dissertations and in working 
paper series, including those in Policy Research Working Paper Series or Social Science 
Research Network. Section 2 presents lessons reported in the literature, followed by 
Section 3 which introduces the meta-regression analysis, the key concepts (on economies 
of scale and scope), and explains the variables utilized in the study. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results; concluding observations are outlined in Section 5. 
 
2. LESSONS FROM LITERATURE: A SHORT SURVEY 
 
Ford and Warford (1969) were among the first authors to investigate scale economies in 
the water sector. They tried to identify an appropriate specification of the cost function for 
water utilities in the UK and argued that amalgamation of firms would not necessarily lead 
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to a lowering of average costs. In the following two decades (70s and 80s), the literature 
focused primarily on issues of ownership, researching whether the type of ownership 
(public or private) influenced performance. The research is inconclusive regarding this 
issue. While some papers provided empirical evidence that publicly-owned water utilities 
have better performance (e.g. Bruggink, 1982), other studies concluded that private water 
utilities outperform the public ones (e.g. Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978); others did not find 
conclusive evidence that one ownership regime outperformed the other (e.g. Byrnes et al., 
1986). Of course, model specification differed across these early studies; in addition, 
controlling for different governance (and incentive) systems was difficult due to inadequate 
data.  
 
Some studies about scale and scope economies in the water sector were found in our 
census of studies, but all refer to the US and the UK. For example, Knapp (1978) reported 
strong economies of scale in the wastewater treatment in England and Wales. Fox and 
Hofler (1985) observed economies of scale in water distribution and diseconomies of scale 
in the production of water in the US. Kim (1987), in a study of US utilities, did not find 
significant economies of scale in drinking water supply, but found some economies of 
scale for non-residential water supply and some diseconomies of scale for residential water 
supply. During this period (70s and 80s), the first studies examining scope economies 
appeared. For instance, Hayes (1987) observed economies of scope in the US for small, 
vertically integrated companies, but not for the large ones. In another US study, Kim and 
Clark (1988) detected scope economies for joint production of residential and non-
residential water supply. 
 
In the two decades that followed (the 1990s and 2000s) the number of benchmarking 
studies published about water sector cost and production functions more than doubled. 
However, there was still no consensus regarding optimal size of water utilities or the extent 
of scope economies (Abbott and Cohen, 2009). For example, Ashton (1999), among others, 
found economies of scale in the UK, but Saal and Parker (2000) and other authors obtained 
opposite results. Subsequently, a study from Stone and Webster (2004) concluded that the 
biggest companies in England and Wales (water and wastewater companies) presented 
diseconomies of scale and the remaining small water-only companies displayed economies 
of scale. Later Saal and Parker (2004) found constant returns to scale and Saal et al. (2007) 
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revisited the issue, finding that large water and sewerage utilities are characterized by 
diseconomies of scale in England and Wales.  
 
For the US, as in the two previous decades, strong economies of scale were found 
(Bhattacharya et al., 1994; Shih et al. 2006). However, Torres and Morrison Paul (2006) 
observed economies of scale for small utilities but diseconomies of scale for the largest 
utilities. Similar results were obtained for other countries, including Italy (Fabbri and 
Fraquelli, 2000; Fraquelli and Giandrone, 2003; and Fraquelli and Moiso, 2005), France 
(Garcia and Thomas, 2001), Japan (Mizutani and Urakami, 2001), South Korea (Kim and 
Lee, 1998) and South Africa (Tsegai et al., 2009). Recently, Nauges and van den Berg 
(2008) found economies of scale in Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam for small and 
medium utilities but not in Brazil. In other countries, such as Portugal (Correia and 
Marques, 2010; and Martins et al., 2006), Germany (Sauer, 2005), in Latin America (Ferro 
et al., 2010), Peru (Corton, 2010), Spain (Prieto et al., 2009) and Canada (Renzetti, 1999), 
most studies found economies of scale in providing water services. However, for 
Switzerland, Baranzini and Faust (2009) found diseconomies of scale for multi-utilities. 
The Appendix lists the studies estimating economies of scale that made up the sample 
utilized in the current study. 
 
Regarding research on economies of scope, again results in the literature are mixed. Of the 
studies examining scope economies between water and wastewater services, a large 
proportion find scope economies (e.g. Fraquelli et al., 2004, Lynk, 1993; Hunt and Lynk, 
1995; Fraquelli and Moiso, 2005 and Martins et al., 2006), although some analysts 
conclude that the savings are greater for small companies than for large ones. However, 
other studies concluded just the opposite (Saal and Parker, 2000 and Stone and Webster, 
2004). For example, the study by Stone and Webster Consultants reports that in England 
and Wales no scope economies exist between water and wastewater. Also, Correia and 
Marques (2010) observed decreasing economies of scope in Portugal. Similarly, Prieto et 
al. (2009) found no evidence of statistically significant scope economies in Spain. 
 
Apart from the activities of water supply and wastewater collection, the comprehensive 
sample identified studies quantifying economies of scope between other activities in multi-
utilities, such as electricity, urban waste or gas services. For example, Fraquelli et al. 
(2004) and Piacenza and Vannoni (2004) found significant scope economies for multi-
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utilities in Italy. Other studies investigated scope economies associated with vertical 
integration and suggest the existence of scope economies in joint retail and wholesale 
segments, especially for the smallest water utilities (Hayes, 1987). For example, Stone and 
Webster Consultants (2004) observed benefits in vertical integration in the water supply in 
England and Wales; Torres and Morrison Paul (2006) reached the same conclusions for the 
water sector in the US. Urakami (2007) examined the Japanese water supply industry and 
noted the existence of economies of vertical integration between water intake-purification 
and the water distribution stage. In contrast, Garcia et al. (2007), using a sample of US 
utilities, concluded that separation maybe advantageous in some circumstances, and that 
economies of vertical integration are not significant except for the smallest utilities. 
Appendix 2 lists all the studies found in the literature that empirically examined economies 
of scope. 
 
Although there is no consensus in the literature regarding the optimal size of water utilities 
or the existence of economies of scope among various activities, it is generally agreed that 
small water utilities providing only one service or that are not vertically integrated have 
significant scale and scope economies that seldom are achieved due to relatively low levels 
of output; large or vertically integrated utilities seem to have scale and scope diseconomies 
at the levels of output they produce. The literature reports a wide range of a maximum 
number of connections where economies of scale were not exhausted. For example, 
Fraquelli and Giandrone (2003) found values of 100,000 in Italy, while Mizutani and 
Urakami (2001) found 766,000 (in Japan) and Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) estimated the 
leveling off point at one million for Italy. There is less divergence of views in relation to 
wastewater activities, in part because these activities have been subject to less research or 
have been examined in the context of businesses undertaking both water supply and 
wastewater activities (e.g. Ashton, 2000). Both Knapp (1978) and Renzetti (1999), who are 
exceptions, found that economies of scale exist in the wastewater sector. The results 
reported in the literature are more consistent with regard to economies of density and, in 
general, the studies point to both their existence and to their importance (Antonioli and 
Fillipini, 2001; Zoric, 2006). 
 
These findings are not surprising, given differences between the geographic, hydrologic, 
topographic circumstances in different countries or regions or to, differences in ownership, 
degree of corporatization, and to the legal framework for providing the activities of the 
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water sector (including the existence, or absence, of regulatory or ministerial oversight). 
Also density, customer income levels, distance from water sources, and a variety of other 
factors may (or may not) have been adequately controlled for in particular studies. 
However, to a certain extent it is clear that there are savings from the use of shared 
resources and from reduced administrative and procurement costs per customer; the issue 
is whether such economies outweigh  the greater  costs associated with network 
complexity, and possibly the bureaucracy accompanying the increase in the size of the 
utility. The literature is also inconclusive as far as the issue of ownership is concerned. 
Recently Bel et al. (2010) conducted a meta-regression analysis examining privately-
owned and publically-owned water distribution services with a sample of twenty-seven 
studies; they found no systematic support for lower costs with private production.  They 
did not investigate the extent of economies of scale and scope, so it is useful to apply the 
technique to this technical question. 
 
3. META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Narrative literature reviews generally identify all the available studies, listing conclusions 
for each one. However, such an approach does not consider model specification, number of 
observations, and other factors affecting the quality of the studies, so the conclusions from 
such surveys tend to be impressionistic rather than definitive. This problem can be 
mitigated by applying a meta-regression analysis. This technique combines the results of 
several studies that address a particular research topic and, through statistical methods, 
tries to find the true relationship between different variables and the results reported in the 
different studies (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). The present study examines the influence of 
several variables on the results found in benchmarking studies that address the issue of 
scale and scope economies in the water services sector.  
 
According to Stanley and Jarrell (1989) a meta-regression analysis can be performed using 
the following model: 
 
( )LjeZb jK
k
jkkj ...,,2,1
1
=++= ∑
=
αβ                                      ( )1  
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where bj is the reported estimate of β of the jth study of the literature consisting of L 
studies, β is the “true” value of the parameter under examination, Zjk are the meta-
independent variables that measure relevant characteristics of an empirical study, and αk 
are the coefficients related to these independent variables which reflect the systematic 
biasing effect of particular characteristics studied, and ej is the meta-regression disturbance 
term. 
 
In this study we apply a random effects meta-analysis that estimates the extent to which 
several covariates explain heterogeneity in the dependent variables (in this case, scale and 
scope economies) between studies. For this purpose, a weighted normal-error regression 
model was performed in which an additive between study variance component 2τ is 
estimated. First the maximum-likelihood estimates of the αk parameters assuming 0ˆ2 =τ  
are obtained by weighted regression, and then a moment estimator of 2τ  is calculated using 
the residual sum of squares (Sharp, 1998).  
 
For situations where the number of studies is particularly small, it is advisable to apply an 
additional test (permutation test), to obtain better results with respect to the p-values 
associated with independent variables. Permutation tests provide a nonparametric way of 
simulating data (by Monte Carlo simulation) under the null hypothesis (Harbord and 
Higgins, 2008). 
 
The statistical significance of the coefficients associated with the independent variables 
will allow us to examine the influence of this variable on the dependent variable. This 
meta-regression analysis considers as dependent variable bj, the corresponding values of 
estimated overall (or aggregate) scale economies (SL) and the degree of economies of 
scope (SC) obtained by the studies in the sample (here, a sample that approaches a census).   
 
According to Baumol (1976) and Panzar and Willig (1977) the degree of scale economies 
(SL) for the multi-product water utility is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ∑∑ ==
i
Cyii
i
iMCy
yCySL ε
1                                                             ( )2  
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where C is the total cost of producing outputs y, MCi is the marginal cost with respect to 
the ith output and iCyi yC lnln ∂∂=ε  is the cost elasticity of the ith output.  The existence 
of (dis)economies of scale is assessed according to whether SL(y) is greater than, equal to, 
or less than unity. If SL>1 the water utility operates with economies of scale (or size); if 
SL<1 the water utility operates with diseconomies of scale. If, on the other hand, SL=1, that 
means that the water utility operates at constant returns to scale. 
 
Moreover, economies of scope are related to the fact that joint production costs are lower 
than the sum of the production costs for separate specialized water utilities, and the degree 
of economies of scope (SC) is defined by: 
 
( ) ( )
( )yC
yCyC
SC
n
i
in∑
=
− −
= 1                                                   ( )3  
 
where ( ) ( )niiin yyyyCyC ,...,,0,,..., 111 +−− = . 
 
Herein, if SC>0 the water utility faces economies of scope and if SC<0 the water utility 
presents diseconomies of scope. 
 
The meta-regression analysis utilized Stata software. The model included the following 
variables for each study: sample size (number of water utilities analyzed), year of 
publication, number of years studied, the GDP of the country, the continent where the 
utilities are located, the estimation method used in the study, the type of utilities involved 
(whether or not they are multi-utilities), publication type of the study, the average size of 
utilities, the primary ownership-type for firms in the study sample and the existence (or 
nonexistence) of regulation. A positive sign of the coefficient αk indicates that the 
corresponding explanatory variable tends to be larger, thus increasing the reported scale or 
the scope economies; if the coefficient presents a negative sign, it means that the 
explanatory variable tends to negatively affect estimated scale or scope economies. 
 
The variable GDP of the country took on the values of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
reported for 2009. This variable reflects the country's standard of living. The variable 
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Continent is a dummy variable with assigned values from 1 to 5: 1 corresponds to the 
Continent with the highest GDP (United States/Canada) and 5 to the Continent with lowest 
GDP (Africa). The value 2 was assigned to Europe, 3 to Asia, and 4 to South 
America/Central America. The meta-regression included the estimation method used in the 
studies, the type of utilities involved (whether they were multi-utilities, value 1, or not, 
value 0) and the publication type of the study. Each of the variables captures differences in 
the studies. For the estimation method, the dummy variable takes on the value 1 for studies 
that apply several estimation methods and takes on the value 0 for studies that apply only 
one estimation method. The estimation methods observed in the literature included 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), Nonlinear 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (NLSUR), Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Restricted Least Squares (RLS). When each 
variable was tested separately, the coefficients lacked statistical significance, so the final 
model does not consider them individually. The dummy variable for publication type takes 
the value 1 for Theses and Journals and the value 0 for Reports, Chapters and Working 
Papers). Since Theses and Journal articles must pass more rigorous reviews, the sign on 
this coefficient provides an indication of whether economies are more likely to be found in 
more technically-refined empirical analyses. Furthermore, we examined the influence of 
the average size of utilities (represented by the amount of water billed in cubic meters), the 
influence of ownership (if mostly public, value 1, or mostly private, value 0) and the 
existence or nonexistence of regulation (if there is a sector specific regulator, value 1, or if 
not, value 0). Although monopoly utilities generally face some type of oversight—even if 
by locally elected officials or a water ministry, this variable is intended to capture the 
impact of more formal national regulation. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Since in this case-study samples are small, we applied the permutation test, which has 
supports the results presented in Table 2. Table 3 provides the p-values associated with 
each independent variable. In the first column there are the permutation p-values without 
an adjustment for multiplicity, which are similar to those obtained without using the 
permutation test, and in the second column we find the p-values adjusted for multiplicity. 
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Table 2 – Meta-regression estimates 
  Dependent variable: 
estimates of scale 
economies (SL) 
Dependent variable: 
estimates of scope 
economies (SC) 
Variables Coefficient Standard 
errors 
Coefficient Standard 
errors 
Sample size (No. of 
water utilities 
analyzed) 
0.000030 0.00010 -0.00011 0.00012 
Year of Publication 0.002 0.012 0.018 0.008 
No. of years studied 0.0012 0.0084 0.03 0.047 
GDP of country  -3.46e-8** 1.41e-8 3.53e-9 1.73e-8 
Continent -0.096 0.065 0.0037 0.13 
Estimation method  -0.20* 0.10 -0.29 0.22 
Type of utilities 0.031 0.098 0.030 0.18 
Publication Type -0.095 0.093 -0.23 0.22 
Average size of 
utilities -1.12e
-9* 8.55e-10 -2.69e-9 1.92e-9 
Ownership -0.018 0.13 -0.068 0.24 
Regulation 0.07 0.17 0.49 0.44 
Intercept 1.65 0.25 0.39 0.40 
R2 0.177 0.170 
Joint test for all 
covariates 
With Knapp-Hartung 
modification  
F(9.25)=1.65 
 
Prob > F = 0.1543 
F(9.3)=1.19 
 
Prob > F = 0.4932 
N 35 13 
*** - significant at the 1 percent level, ** - significant at the 5 percent level,  
* - significant at the 10 percent level 
 
Table 3 – p-values associated with each independent variable using the permutation test 
  Dependent variable: 
estimates of scale 
economies (SL) 
Dependent variable: 
estimates of scope 
economies (SC) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
Sample size (No. of water 
utilities analyzed) 0.698 1.000 0.260 0.657 
Year of Publication 0.927 1.000 0.130 0.446 
No. of years studied 0.940 1.000 0.731 0.990 
GDP of country  0.024 0.203 0.646 0.970 
Continent 0.143 0.692 0.552 0.928 
Estimation method  0.063 0.418 0.152 0.262 
Type of utilities 0.930 1.000 0.541 0.921 
Publication Type 0.379 0.971 0.980 1.000 
Average size of utilities 0.083 0.779 0.396 0.812 
Ownership 0.901 1.000 0.956 1.000 
Regulation 0.671 1.000 0.562 0.934 
 
Regarding the economies of scale, the results indicate that the coefficient of the variable 
sample size (number of utilities analyzed) is positive. This means that when the sample 
size is greater, economies of scale are more likely to be found. Although the value of this 
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coefficient is not statistically significant to a confidence level of 95%, we would expect a 
relationship since, in general, the samples are composed of many utilities which are 
generally smaller; thus, there is greater potential for scale economies. After adjusting for 
multiple testing, there remains some weak evidence that the number of utilities analyzed 
has influence on the degree of economies of scale. The adjusted p-value of 1.000 gives the 
probability under the null hypothesis (that all regression coefficients are zero) of a T 
statistic for any of the covariates being as extreme as the one observed for the covariate 
“number of utilities analyzed.” However, the opposite result is obtained for scope 
economies (although without statistical significance to a confidence level of 95%), which 
suggests that the samples with greater number of utilities are more likely to have 
diseconomies of scope. 
 
A positive signal was determined for the year of publication both for scale and scope 
economies. It means that the most recent studies are more likely to find economies of scale 
and economies of scope. This can be related to some consolidation of the water sector 
market structure overtime or to the fact that early studies presumably used less 
sophisticated estimation techniques and simpler models (reflecting limited data 
availability). Nevertheless, the statistical significance of the results obtained is weak at a 
confidence level of 95%. 
 
The coefficient for the variable “number of years studied” has a positive sign for both 
cases. This means that studies that analyze a greater number of years are more likely to 
find scale and scope economies. However, again, these coefficients are not statistically 
significant at a confidence level of 95%. The coefficient for country GDP has a negative 
sign and it is statistically significant for the case of scale economies at a confidence level of 
95%. This result suggests that countries with higher GDP are more likely to exhibit 
diseconomies of scale. This finding also indicates that in countries where the standard of 
living is lower, there are probably many utilities with significant economies of scale to be 
exploited. That point is corroborated by the negative value of the coefficient of the variable 
Continent, corresponding to the higher value of GDP to the lowest value of this 
explanatory variable. Yet, for the case of economies of scope, the coefficients of the 
variables GDP and Continent have a positive value. This result indicates that despite not 
being statistically significant, there could be a greater probability of finding scope 
economies in more developed countries. Since few of these studies include service quality 
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as an output, the role of GDP is mixed. Developed countries tend to meet World Health 
Organization standards for water quality and the treatment levels for wastewater meet strict 
standards. Neither is the case for low income nations so that interpreting the role of income 
levels on estimated economies of scale and scope is not simple. 
 
Clearly, the application of more sophisticated estimation techniques leads to improved 
modeling. How do results from studies using single estimation techniques differ from those 
employing multiple approaches? For the estimation method adopted, the corresponding 
coefficient is negative for both cases, but only statistically significant to a confidence level 
of 90% for the case of scale economies. This means that studies that apply multiple 
estimation methods have a higher probability of finding scale and scope diseconomies.  
 
Regarding the type of utilities studied, it seems that the corresponding coefficient is 
positive for both cases, which means that multi-utilities are more likely to have scale and 
scope economies. Finding economies of scope is more likely in multi-utilities between 
different types of services (e.g. water and wastewater services) than finding economies of 
vertical integration in the utilities that provide only one service.  This reflects typical 
results found in the literature, although, again, without statistical significance at a 95% 
confidence level.  
 
As for the type of publication, the corresponding coefficient is negative for both cases, but 
(again) without statistical significance at a confidence level of 95%. It seems that scale and 
scope diseconomies are more likely to be found in studies published in Theses and 
Journals. In their examination of the impact of privatized production, Bel et. al. (2010) 
concluded that there is a publication bias related to privatization studies: “papers obtaining 
significant cost savings are more likely to be published” (p. 573). However, one could 
argue that unpublished papers have not passed the hurdle of critical external reviews, so the 
differences in results could be a reflection of reality rather than some presumed 
investigator bias.  In the case of the results reported here, there is no reason to think that 
there is a systematic journal acceptance bias in favor of studies that find scale and scope 
diseconomies.  
 
The variable average size of utilities has a negative sign for both cases, but it is only 
statistically significant at a of 90% confidence level for the case of scale economies. This 
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supports typical findings in the literature: there is a higher probability of finding 
diseconomies of scale and scope when the sample involves large utilities. 
 
As to the ownership variable ownership, the coefficient is negative for both cases. This 
suggests that publicly-owned utilities are more likely to display scale and scope 
diseconomies. Although the value of this coefficient is not statistically significant at a 
confidence level of 95% for either case, this statement is consistent with private utilities 
enjoying greater scale and scope economies. This result contrasts with the meta-regression 
study by Bel et. al. (2010) which finds no empirical evidence of cost savings from private 
provision of water distribution.  One explanation may be that given the prevalence of state-
owned enterprises in water (including municipal ownership), there is some endogeneity in 
the decision to privatize: utilities with scale and scope economies are more likely to be 
privatized.   
 
Finally, regarding the regulation variable, the coefficient is positive for both cases but not 
statistically significant at a confidence level of 95%. This result provides some support for 
regulated environments being associated with utilities having scale and scope economies. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis yields some interesting conclusions that have not been emphasized in the 
quantitative literature on water sector economies of scale and scope. The results show that 
there is a higher probability of finding diseconomies of scale and scope in large utilities, 
although statistical significance was only found for scale diseconomies. In addition, 
countries with higher GDP are more likely to have utilities that exhibit (statistically 
significant) diseconomies of scale, while the opposite pattern appears for economies of 
scope. 
 
Although not statistically significant, publicly owned utilities are more likely to have scale 
and scope diseconomies than when the ownership is mostly private. In addition, multi-
utilities are more likely to exhibit scale and scope economies. These patterns suggest that, 
based on empirical results reported in the literature, economies of scope in multi-utilities 
are more pronounced between different types of services (e.g. water and wastewater 
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services) than economies of vertical integration in the utilities that provide only one 
service. 
 
Finding definitive results in meta-regression analysis requires that all the factors 
characterizing individual studies be included in the model. Furthermore, the linearity of the 
model (assumed in most analyses of multiple regression-based econometric studies) 
ignores possible non-linearity in the relationships among the explanatory variables.  
Nevertheless, periodic examination of empirical studies provides a systematic check on 
results to date.  As new databases become available, and additional variables are included 
in cost and production function models, our understanding of causal links between inputs 
and outputs improves.  Here, the focus has been on economies of scale and scope, topics 
that are central to decisions to consolidate current operators or to decentralize operations. 
However, the decision-relevance of the scholarly literature is still an open question.  Is it 
obvious that a utility operating in a region of diseconomies of scale should be split up, as in 
the case of Manila?  Were the resulting performance gains in Manila due to the availability 
of yardstick comparisons, privatization, or to achieving an “optimal” size?  Should two 
separate organizations be maintained for water and wastewater when a coefficient of a 
study suggests that economies of scope are being missed?  Although few would argue 
against “evidence-based” decision-making, the weight given to facts is unlikely to be the 
deciding factor for those responsible for water sector policies. 
 
An interview with John Briscoe (2011) identifies the disconnect between national policy-
makers, advocates, international civil servants and researchers as creating lost 
opportunities.  He sees the need for water policy to recognize that a broader set of social 
challenges warrant our attention and that the timing of dramatic initiatives seldom depends 
on empirical studies.  Briscoe concludes his interview with some words of wisdom: 
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So I see a great challenge in building a new water intelligencia, one which has 
learned that there is a big difference between idea and practice, but one which seeks 
to bring new ideas – but ideas which will work – to address this generation of 
challenges. And one which communicates far better than the practical water 
communities today manage to do! . . . We have to learn that political capital is 
limited, and challenges are many. The great advances are made in those special 
moments when political possibility aligns with our agenda. We have to learn to 
strike when that iron is hot (and not keep thinking that we are the ones who will 
heat the iron!). 
Thus, quantitative studies of water and wastewater utilities can identify opportunities for 
aggregation and disaggregation: they can help establish a policy agenda.  However, 
political factors will continue to play a dominant role in policy-decisions related to 
economies of scale and scope. 
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